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Abstract
Background: This article examines uncomfortable realities that the European hospital sector currently faces and the
potential impact of wide-spread rationalization policies such as (hospital) payment reform and privatization.
Methods: Review of relevant international literature.
Results: Based on the evidence we present, rationalization policies such as (hospital) payment reform and
privatization will probably fall short in delivering better quality of care and lower growth in health expenses.
Reasons can be sought in a mix of evidence on the effectiveness of these rationalization policies. Nevertheless,
pressures for different business models will gradually continue to increase and it seems safe to assume that more
value-added process business and facilitated network models will eventually emerge.
Conclusions: The overall argument of this article holds important implications for future research: how can
policymakers generate adequate leverage to introduce such changes without destroying necessary hospital
capacity and the ability to produce quality healthcare.
Keywords: European hospitals, Governance, Privatization, Payment reform, Cost-containment, Hospital
management, Hospital business models
Background
Clinically, hospitals still form a cornerstone of health
care delivery systems, but important parts of (future)
growth are now reserved for community care, outpatient
surgery, and other outpatient services [38]. Moreover,
while prior technological innovations were once a main
factor in pushing doctors into hospitals, current devel-
opments now enable physicians to perform an increasing
share of their workload outside the bricks and mortar of
community hospitals. This movement of care outside
hospital walls is being further reinforced by rising num-
bers of chronic diseases such as obesity and diabetes,
which increase the relevance of behavioural not medical
strategies. All these extra-hospital forces can be expected
to intensify as a result of austerity measures adopted
across Europe since the onset of the 2008 financial crisis
[43, 49].
Financially, hospitals expend a large part of health-
care’s fiscal appropriations and are a very ‘visible’ part of
the healthcare budget. Many countries still enforce a
central allocation for large hospital capital projects and
most hospital payment schemes retain elements of glo-
bal budgeting. Hospital expenditure alongside pharma-
ceutical costs form top priorities for current and
additional cuts among budgetary decision makers [33].
However, routine incremental budgeting strategies such
as temporary accumulating provider deficits, postponing
capital projects, and slicing reimbursement rates across
the board cannot provide a viable long-term solution.
Lastly and most relevantly for national health policy-
makers, when looked at from an organizational perspective,
hospitals now form a mature industry, with the number of
hospital beds having declined for a considerable period of
time [32], and with fiscal pressures on hospitals to make
more fundamental changes that nonetheless continue to
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increase. This unrelenting fiscal pressure also impacts the
relationship between medicine and management, as
physician-entrepreneurs, be it in their field of expertise or
those that are more commercially aware, emerge to help
shape the future of the hospital sector [10, 36].
This article examines how changes in hospital struc-
ture and funding combine with tightening austerity mea-
sures to affect the process and outcome of hospital
governance. It explores the fundamental tension between
how hospitals have evolved and two main political strat-
egies —payment reform and privatization— which have
been advanced thus far to deal with financial austerity as
well as the above-noted technological and epidemio-
logical trends that shift healthcare provision away from
hospitals. Section 2 describes why payment reform and
privatization have become important aspects of policy
strategies. Section 3 analyses further pressures on trad-
itional hospital business models. Sections 4 (payment re-
form) and 5 (privatization) consider the evidence on these
topics well as technical and non-technical rationales of
moving in these directions. Section 6 covers several im-
portant methodological limitations. Section 7 concludes
and summarizes the contribution of this paper.
Maintaining the hospital sector with payment reform and
privatization
There exists a large body of literature that describes how
hospitals gradually evolved from alms houses and nurs-
ing homes towards a combination of what currently are
its core assets: emergency departments, operation the-
atres and (expensive) specialized equipment surrounded
by ICU and CCU beds. Medium care nursing units and
outpatient departments now are often literally situated
as a second circle around these core assets. We do know
from a large base of studies and analyses about the for-
midable veto powers and political influence of hospitals
and their doctors [14, 21]. Hospital access was very
important for physicians and continual professional con-
flicts were natural [1, 46].
Such conflicts contributed to the shaping of gate-
keeper systems in the UK and the Netherlands among
other countries. Gatekeeping helped to guarantee that
doctors in- and outside hospitals had their own patient
base. The idea that gatekeeping is also a useful precondi-
tion for efficiency, which has been adopted by about half
of EU health systems [41], only developed later on. In
Germany, a line was drawn between all outpatient and
all inpatient care, meaning that hospitals were -and to a
large extent still are- strictly focused on inpatient care,
which is thought by some commentators to have
increased the volume of duplicative procedures and
diagnostics as well as the length of stay [44]. The profes-
sional importance of hospitals was also underlined by
the fact that it was quite common in the first half of the
twentieth century that (groups of ) doctors built private
clinics if they did not have access to other hospital own-
ership types [23]. In countries with substantial numbers
of non-profit hospitals such as the Netherlands, Belgium
and the populous industrial areas of the Western part of
Germany, this was less common. However, a private par-
allel provider system is still visible in countries where
the formalization of universal access is more recent,
such as in parts of Southern Europe. The monolithic
and underfunded public ownership-led hospital sector in
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union was in essence dis-
mantled as remarkably fast as it was built [28].
During the era of the European welfare state, the in-
creasingly prestigious and ever more expensive hospital
sector led to a series of complicated funding issues. Main-
tenance of assets instead of expansion of capacity came to
the fore. To distribute and fine tune existing resources,
countries needed payment systems. For hospitals, this
usually (but not exclusively) implied separate models be-
tween the funding for capital investments and the funding
of current or operating costs [23]. In general, public inter-
ference was larger for capital appropriations with
certificate-of-need regulations. Current costs were over-
whelmingly paid on a per diem base, more recently
followed by activity-based payment categories such as
diagnostic-related-groups. However, such payment
models were strictly regulated and the prevalent solu-
tions in Europe remained for decades under the um-
brella of the public sector. In search of value-for-
money and hospital efficiency, however, hospital man-
agement/ownership patterns are now changing and
different payment models are being tried.
Two trends have become influential. The first includes
a wave of reform in the running of public hospitals,
starting with the application of various New Public Man-
agement models [20, 34] which transformed public hos-
pitals into various types of semi-autonomous institutions
[42] funded by range of different contracting arrange-
ments both inside the public sector and between public
and private institutions. With the exception of university
clinics, the boundaries in many countries between the
public and private sectors have increasingly become
blurred [40]. Examples include the creation of founda-
tion trusts in the UK as well as the transformation in the
late 1980s in Germany of directly steered public hospi-
tals into independent public companies. There also has
been noticeable growth in the size and capacity of the
for-profit hospital sector (Table 1).
In most European countries, private for-profit hospi-
tals have grabbed a bigger share of the market, mostly
by acquiring and re-structuring other hospital types. In
most countries the private sector also is becoming in-
creasingly consolidated into a few large groups [30].
Hospital groups such as Helios (Germany), Asklepios
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(Germany), Generale de Sante (France), Capio (Sweden),
Quiron (Spain), and the General Healthcare Group and
Spire Healthcare (UK) each now own dozens of facilities.
One notable impact of this real privatization (e.g. change
in ownership to profit-making institutions) has been that
the allocation of capital in this part of the health care
system has become governed by requirements set by the
financial markets. Change from public to private owner-
ship forms an inherent political dispute [46]. In addition
to technical arguments regarding efficiency, as for
example have been put forward by New Labour when
they opened up the NHS to the independent sector at
the beginning of this century, ownership changes involve
ideological questions in which social norms and values
come to the fore [26].
The reform of payment schedules was a second trend
and generally is debated in more technical terms if com-
pared to issues of hospital privatization. Hospitals now
are typically paid through some kind of activity-based
costing system (diagnosis related groups or DRGs) in
most OECD countries [45]. The idea was that such a
payment model induces shorter average-length-of-stay
and thus fosters internal operating efficiency while also
reducing waiting lists. Most studies do indicate that
DRGs have contributed to lower length-of-stays, but also
that they offer few incentives to control overall costs of
hospital care [9]. However, in all countries hospital
prices are still overwhelmingly fixed by regulation, with
the Netherlands as a notable exception. In that country,
70 % of hospital services turnover is freely negotiable;
early evaluations indicate that in these free segments
prices have come down further, while at the same time
volumes have increased more rapidly [22]. More
recently, some countries have tried to add pay-for-
performance elements to these reimbursement models.
The idea was to stimulate the actual benefits per euro
spent. The results have been inconclusive; although one
recent study from the UK found relative mortality
improvements [47], these improvements were not
sustained over a longer period [39].
Pressures on traditional hospital business models
Contemporary European hospitals operate a variety of
different business models inside a single organization.
For example diagnostics, office visits, elective surgery,
emergency treatment or nursing and rehabilitation re-
quire different assets, human skills, and organizational
procedures. However, since hospitals tend to deliver as
many services as possible, these expansionist strategies
inevitably increase the complexity of these organizations.
Current ‘business school’ strategies for hospital redesign
try to untangle such complexities and build more coher-
ent groups of assets, such as focused factories or facili-
tated network organizations [10, 18, 36].
Table 1 For-profit hospital beds
1995 2000 2005 2010 2013
Austria Total beds 67.853 63.674 63.248 64.008 56.347
% for-profit 6,9 7,1 9,0 11,1 15,1
Czech Total beds 87.784 79.985 77.309 73.746 67.888
% for-profit 13,7 17.7
Denmark Total beds 22.927 20.902 19.405 17.241
% for-profits 0,1 1,4 2,1 2,1
Finland Total beds 41.483 39.026 37.000 31.395 26.429
% for-profits 3,3 3,3 3,7 4,4 4,2
France Total beds 484.279 455.175 416.710 413.206
% for-profits 19,8 20,4 23,4 23,7
Germany Total beds 698.303 674.473 667.560
% for-profits 26,2 29,7 29,8
Italy Total beds 234.375 215.980 203.723
% for-profits 28,1 28,0 27,6
Netherlands Total beds 81.437 76.859 72.698 76.980
% for-profit 0 0 0 0
Poland Total beds 248.860 251.456 252.281
% for-profit 17,0 24,3 26,8
Spain Total beds 154.644 148,081 145.863 145.199 138.153
% for-profit 19,4 17,9 19,6 17,7 18,8
(Source: OECD health data, January 8th 2016)
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Calls also exists for a fundamental redirection of the de-
livery system itself, which requires a paradigm shift and
the adoption of patient-centric integrated care, improved
hospital efficiency, and interventions in an optimal setting,
either in hospitals, at home or in communities’ [13]. In-
patient elective surgeries, once a cornerstone for the use
of a hospital building, have started to decline among 14
selected procedures for Medicare beneficiaries [8]. Health
care systems across Europe now need to tackle system-
wide inefficiencies in the balance of care provided between
hospitals, primary care and other settings, particularly
after governments have allowed substantial duplication,
imbalance and overlap under different justifications [3].
Other than their very substantial size and bargaining
power, hospitals hold few strong cards; increasing shares
of their activities are performed on an outpatient basis,
whether inside or outside the institution. The value of
the activities undertaken in hospitals will depend ultim-
ately on (i) the quality of the care provided and the lean
implementation of such procedures, and (ii) on the im-
pact of such care on patients’ health in comparative
terms with primary care and ambulatory or hybrid mo-
dalities. The potential reach of such structural changes
might be large; the traditional network advantages of
hospital systems seem to decline. Preserving (hospital)
organisations is not seen as a sustainable strategy to de-
liver value [12].
Such statements align with Clayton Christensen’s con-
tention [10] that hospitals still mainly function as solution
shops (non-standardized processes to solve complex diag-
nostic puzzles) and that the autonomization of (part of)
the delivered services into value-added process business
and facilitated networks are in a preliminary phase. Value-
adding process activities are designed to optimize out-
comes and reduce variety by standardization of proven
techniques. The Martini Clinic in Hamburg is a well-
known showcase for its superior outcome in the area of
prostate cancer [37]. Facilitated networks depend on
optimal organization, facilitation, and operation of net-
works and have been proven promising in the coordin-
ation of chronic illnesses such as Parkinsons’ disease in
the Netherlands [5].
Regarding value-added process business: ‘assembly
lines’ of low cost, high frequency, low variation services
still spread hesitantly in most countries. It is here where
the for-profit sector is gaining most ground, although it
is also accused of cherry-picking. In contrast to public
and non-profit ownership types, for-profits also seem to
have much more aggressively relied on traditional net-
work efficiencies by building larger provider groups
(back-office integration and standardization). Facilitated
network organizations and e-health procedures hold poten-
tially even more disruptive pressures. Such models rely on
patient involvement and intensive communication between
professionals. However, integrative models of outpatient de-
partments and advanced primary care functions supple-
mented by new modalities, such as e-health and patient
networks, often have difficulties accessing the healthcare
markets and obtaining reimbursement due to their non-
traditional character where scheduled appointments and
treatments in physicians’ offices and clinics might no longer
be needed.
Christensen’s solution shop hospital stays important
for complex treatments—neonatology, neurosurgery,
many cancers etc. Despite their routine complaints
about cherry picking by other providers, it is here where
tertiary hospitals continue to have substantial leverage.
‘Palaces of complexity’ that handle high cost, high
variation, and low frequency care are still needed in the
distant and not so distant future. From that perspective,
it is the less complex European community hospital that
is under threat due to the growth of modern outpatient
centers and facilitated networks, not the large academic
providers such as Karolinska in Stockholm, Charité
Hospitals in Berlin, or Guy’s and St. Thomas in London.
Nevertheless, further growth of these new decentralized
and often private provider models will necessarily
change the relation between medicine and management.
Other skills that relate to ICT and competencies of oper-
ational excellence will increase in relevance versus those
that are needed for routine medical procedures and gen-
eral consults at the doctor’s office.
Payment reform: ‘savings’ and ‘more quality’?
Hospitals need payment schemes. Such schemes may focus
on beds, hospital stays, physician fees, global budgets, spe-
cific procedures and treatments, outlier payments and add-
ons for certain expensive pharmaceuticals and treatments,
or diagnostic-related payment. Modern healthcare systems
register increasing amounts of data and more and more
seek to pay for quality of care as the prime proxy for out-
come of hospital treatments. Payment reform is framed as
simply a technical effort to pay (higher amounts) for better
outcomes and quality of care. Many countries are experi-
menting with paying for performance (especially in primary
care), paying for the entire continuum of care (bundling),
and paying capitated models.
Substantial numbers of policymakers hold high hopes
that paying for quality will eventually solve adverse
effects of the earlier reimbursement schemes. However,
a number of fundamental problems still need to be
resolved, such as the possible crowding out of intrinsic
motivation and the use of rewards versus penalties [11].
If these payment reforms seek cost-control, as many
state they do, complicated design issues grow in political
importance. Cost-containment is not a primary goal for
all stakeholders. Hospitals will typically marshall fierce
opposition towards unwelcome forms of cost-control
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and harness politicians to their defense who feel that the
European welfare state has come under too much pres-
sure. Another (neglected) difficulty might be that in such
efforts of payment reform, modern ICT possibilities can
very well increase the coordination possibilities of agents
and local actors versus their principals.
Pay for performance
‘Best-practice prices’ and ‘pay for performance’ (P4P)
mechanisms of hospital care do require detailed infor-
mation on input mixes, but also on quality, as well as on
medical evidence and clinical agreement concerning
what constitutes good practice both inside and outside
the hospital—about which information is even more
scarce [7]. It is far from clear that European health sys-
tems will produce any of these data trails sufficiently
soon given the current level of development of health
technology assessment (HTA) and of clinical registries.
Regarding the latter, Sweden’s quality registries do form
an exception but the effective use of such tools con-
tinues to be a challenge. Physician-led efforts to reduce
unnecessary tests, treatments and procedures such as
the international spread of the US ‘Choosing Wisely’
campaign also do not see visible roles for payment sys-
tems and purchasers that might unintentionally harm
patients [25]. In the UK the high expectations of the
Quality and Outcomes Framework for primary care, per-
haps the largest P4P experiments in Europe, have so far
not been met [15].
Bundling
Another pressing demand will be the delivery of better-
coordinated care for chronic disease patients. Reforming
the structure of payment systems towards bundled pay-
ments has been one answer, although with inconclusive
outcomes so far [27]. One example is the funding of
diabetes in the Netherlands; a first evaluation shows that
overall quality of care did improve (although a control
group was not included) but hospitals recouped any losses
with additional charges for high-risk diabetes patients,
suggesting up-coding [6]. This illustrates that the develop-
ment of bundled payments at least from the perspective of
cost-containment will be complex (and is prone to the in-
fluence of interest groups). One underlying characteristic
that induces adverse outcomes might be the strict
organizational separation between hospital care and pri-
mary and ambulatory care sanctioned by legislation, with
hospital staff as salaried employees of local or state gov-
ernment while staff outside hospitals are more often pri-
vate, organised in small groups.
Capitation and shared-savings
Models that combine risk-adjusted capitation, shared-
savings and incentives for quality of care, such as the
Alternative Quality Contract in Massachusetts and the
Accountable Care Organization in Medicare, are hailed
as the next solution that will combine cost control and
better quality of care, typically with inclusion of indica-
tors to improve population value (triple aim). Value-
based contracting with weighted capitation funding de-
fining ‘blocks’ of services—such as maternity, acute
trauma care, care for the frail elderly and chronic car-
e—that would stretch across a number of care settings
and providers is an important challenge.
Europe holds some experiences of its own with these
payment innovations. Gesundes Kinzigtal, a small-scale
experiment in southwest Germany claims substantial
savings along improvements in quality of care [19]. Capi-
tated funding models jointly for hospital and primary
care is also currently the case in Alzira/ Valencia, Spain.
Despite theoretical attractions, tremendous practical
challenges remain such as accountability and related reg-
ulations, cost and quality metrics, information technol-
ogy, clinical governance and the development of a
shared organisational culture. In this last regard, it is un-
clear at this stage to what extent the evaluation of Alzira
is really known, as data published are rather incomplete
[2]. It is also important to note that although some high
profile studies do show favourable trends of these
models [31, 51], these savings do not necessarily or auto-
matically accrue to patients or tax payers; physicians and
to a lesser extent purchasers seem to benefit the most
from increasing margins, which in Europe might come
with questions about the appropriateness of such
consequences.
Hospital privatization: ‘stakeholders’ or ‘shareholders’
Hospital management in much of Europe typically de-
cides on internal professional structures, on hiring and
firing, on performance-related incentives, on day-to-day
activity monitoring, on carrying out data collection
for national/regional governments and other payers
and stakeholders, on criteria to evaluate whether ob-
jectives have been achieved and on performance indi-
cators (irrespective of whether or not they are later
published). However, especially in public hospitals, politi-
cians (directly by sitting on the boards or through
appointed board members) continue to play a major stra-
tegic role: they set objectives, establish operational bound-
aries through planning and staffing-level requirements,
negotiate and regulate staffing contracts and payment
levels, and make final decisions about financial depend-
ence. Hospitals are major local employers and thus politi-
cians often have a firm electoral interest in the
continuation of current activity and employment levels at
these institutions. Not surprisingly, they tend to be
hesitant to initiate major organizational change, usually
preferring to add new layers of health care institutions
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crystallized under very different forms and functions in
times of budgetary expansion. On the other hand,
indebted public hospitals form large liabilities on public
balance sheets.
Privatization
Some political actors view hospital privatisation (with its
correlates of for-profit-making full autonomy, market
segmentation and product specialization) as an attractive
option to handle this list of problems. Such discussions
however come with strong non-technical and political
rationales [46] and cannot be seen as entirely separate
from broader developments to retrench and redirect the
European welfare state. Recent trends in some tax-based
European countries suggest that some senior political
figures are willing to experiment with various forms of
changed ownership in an effort to produce better clinical
and financial results (see Table 1). The existing evidence
about the growth of private hospitals in some social in-
surance based countries has attracted considerable at-
tention. The private sector now operates more than one
in every four hospital beds in Germany and one in every
four in France [30]. In England, which has two decades
of sometimes rocky experimentation with changed hos-
pital ownership structures, commissioning of independ-
ent sector providers by the English NHS recently
accounted for 3.5 % of NHS-funded first outpatient ap-
pointments, however this percentage is substantially
higher for certain elective procedures such as hip re-
placements and gallbladder removals [24]. On the nega-
tive side, the first privately run NHS hospital failed after
a critical report on its quality and funding pressures. Cir-
cle, its mother company, pulled the plug from the deal
(the Guardian, January 9th 2015). It remains important
to note that on top of their growing role in tax-funded
health care delivery systems, for-profit providers con-
tinue to serve as a parallel system for well-off inhabitants
in Central and Southern Europe as well as in England.
What do we actually know about the technical per-
formance of private for-profit hospitals? In Europe, pub-
lic, non-profit, and for-profit hospitals often co-exist.
Economic theory tells us that enterprise models are
more efficient if formal ownership controls equals effect-
ive control (thus there are no, or few, agency problems),
and will attract for-profit entrants if decent returns on
investment are probable. Hospital margins depend on
high prices (e.g. due to market power and lack of price
sensitivity) as well as on low costs (due to higher effi-
ciency as well as access to scarce production factors,
such as capital and physicians). Kenneth Arrow pointed
towards information asymmetry as an important market
failure and a main rationale for the dominance of non-
profit (and public) hospitals above for-profit competitors
in well-functioning hospital markets. Others such as
Pauly and Redisch [35] contend that non-profit hospital
providers hurt social efficiency because they tend to act
in the interests of the self-employed physicians, if such
are ‘non-contractable’. Many economists hold the opin-
ion that if services become more ‘contractable’, the ra-
tionale for for-profit ownership increases.
An account of the efficiency of for-profit hospitals still
relies largely on peer-reviewed US studies. Systematic
meta-reviews point towards the fact that for-profit hos-
pitals generally (i) provide less community benefits, (ii)
have somewhat worse mortality ratios in comparison
with non-profit providers but better than public hospi-
tals, and (iii) have few differences in cost-efficiency in
comparison with other ownership types. Most studies il-
lustrate that differences within hospital ownership types
are far more important than differences between for-
profits and public or non-profit hospitals [23].
However, such sobering results come with caveats
from a European perspective. The fact that for-profits
provide less uncompensated care is less relevant in
European countries that generally reimburse all neces-
sary hospital services. Longitudinal studies can also
come to other conclusions than cross-sectional research.
Herr [17] points to the fact that even if (German) for-
profits are less efficient, they may actually increase effi-
ciency if they acquire inefficient public or non-profit
hospitals, a major strategy for their growth. For-profits
generally are more responsive to (financial) incentives
than other ownership types [16]. Some studies also
showed somewhat better performance on quality indica-
tors for French [29] and German for-profits [48].
Another recent study indicated that in France elective
admissions to for-profit providers are shorter as well as
less expensive, compared to other provider types [50].
Thus most technical evidence on the efficiency of for-
profit ownership seems to be inconclusive. But what
about the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of for-profit hospital
margins and cost structures versus other hospital types?
A consistent picture exists among the available evidence,
both in the US as well as Europe [23]. On top of a com-
parable cost-base, for-profits do calculate a higher mar-
gin, which rewards ‘shareholders’ but typically these
funds come from savings in expenses paid to other
‘stakeholders’ such as tax-payers and insurers. For-profits
do appear to have a different cost-structure with higher
compensation for both management and medical staff,
but lower wages for nurses and other employee categor-
ies. As with payment reforms, privatization comes with
important political disputes. Non-technical changes in
the distribution of resources and rents might very well
be much more important than any technical changes on
costs or quality of care. However, for-profits are more
responsive to incentives and other changes and over
time may well contribute towards strategies that seek to
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dismantle the traditional hospital with business models
that support value-adding process activities and facili-
tated networks.
Limitations
This review necessarily has several methodological ca-
veats and limitations. It does not describe in depth the
wide range of external factors that may be shaping the
future development of the hospital sector. An increas-
ingly international healthcare workforce market and dif-
ferent workforce planning assumptions in nation states
could impact hospitals’ ability to operate efficiently. If
occupancy rates are currently above 85 %, as they are in
many European hospitals, declining occupancy rates
might also improve bed availability in emergency cases
and thus medical outcomes [4]. Due to larger numbers
of immigrants and refugees, hospitals may increasingly
act as a safety net for basic services in a number of
countries. However, these potential complications do not
undercut the article’s main argument that hospitals face
increasing difficulties in maintaining their current busi-
ness models.
There are other methodological limitations that should
be noted as well. Hospitals are not always comparable
institutions and focus on different competencies and spe-
cializations, running from small community hospitals to
large university clinics. Publicly operated hospitals can
vary considerably from directly managed units through to
near-independently-managed entities. The range of
hospital ownership arrangements across Europe varies
from publicly owned (national, regional or municipal) to
various types of private not-for-profit (religious and/or
voluntary) or private for-profit companies [40]. As a con-
sequence of this great diversity, observations made in this
article are broadly summatory in nature, and before appli-
cation would need to be passed through the prism of each
country’s specific institutional structures as well as the so-
cial norms and values that guide policy decision-making
within it.
Conclusions
This article examines the uncomfortable realities that
the European hospital sector currently faces and the po-
tential impact of wide-spread rationalization policies
such as (hospital) payment reform and privatization.
Based on the evidence we present, such policies will
probably fall short in delivering better quality of care
and lower growth in health expenses. Reasons can be
sought in a mix of evidence on the effectiveness of these
rationalization policies, which probably will reflect im-
portant non-technical and political rationales that in
practice pursue other goals, such as protecting vested in-
terests of the hospitals as well as many difficult-to-
handle technical complexities that guide these policy
instruments.
The above conclusions suggest decidedly modest ex-
pectations for the solutions proposed by business school
professors such as Michael Porter and Clayton Christen-
sen. To be sure, medical professions’ top performers will
continue to need academic and tertiary care hospitals
for their solution shop as they seek to explore important
new frontiers in patient care. Nevertheless, pressures for
different business models will gradually continue to in-
crease and it seems safe to assume that more value-
added process business and facilitated network models
will eventually emerge, although it is uncertain when
such developments will disrupt the business model of
the hospital as we know it today. Our overall argument
holds important implications for future research: how
can policymakers generate adequate leverage to intro-
duce such changes without destroying necessary hospital
capacity and the ability to produce quality healthcare?
Up to a certain extent, European countries do seem re-
ceptive towards hospital consolidation and privatization.
In many countries, private hospital groups are at the fore-
front of this consolidation process to build national or
even pan-national networks of hospitals. Privatization
might increase the responsiveness of healthcare systems,
especially of ‘contractable’ services and improve the per-
formance of the worst providers, if acquired. These might
be important prerequisites for necessary changes. How-
ever privatization does not seem to provide an answer to
the need for savings simply for being too volume- and
price- driven, although short-term operating budget sav-
ings might occur due to the selling of public assets (often
below their long-term market value).
Policy learning is needed for real change that can
tackle the challenges which cannot be solved within the
current hospital landscape and current relations between
medicine and management. Europe forms an ongoing
natural laboratory test that melts distinctions between
political, managerial and administrative realms as well as
between policy formulation and implementation in a
crowded arena. Both in the public and private health
sectors, hospitals are increasingly seen as transitory step-
ping stones with blurred boundaries, but this transition
is still unclear at the moment in terms of destination.
Most countries do not have active purchasers of care
with the capacity to make refined, value-based contract-
ing arrangements with providers. Only when the pur-
chasing function in European healthcare has been
strengthened will the patterns of change in hospital care
show identifiable trends.
In the meantime, outcomes from the present combin-
ation of organizational pressures and financial restriction
will as always differ in line with normative, organizational
and cultural issues. Similar solutions may well work out
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differently across Europe due to these contextual differ-
ences. A general pattern however can perhaps be ex-
pected: policymakers and public budget holders will
continue to face a tough time as they try to respond to be-
ing boxed in by hospital spending on the one hand and
revenue austerity on the other. Such challenges used to be
handled by top-down freezing of budgets, although with
few directions about where to seek efficiency savings.
More of both might be needed.
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